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• Commercial Crew Program Purpose
• Crew Safety Boundaries
• How we achieve Human Rating
• CoFR Strategy




• CCP Mission Statement: The purpose of the CCP is to facilitate the development of a U.S. 
commercial crew space transportation capability with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost 
effective access to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS).
• Background/Assumptions:
• CCP manages a human rated spaceflight services based contract
• Commercial Provider owns the design (Not NASA)
• NASA does not own the hardware, software, or systems used to fabricate, assemble, test, 
launch, or recover crew to and from ISS
• Certification of the Commercial Transportation System (CTS) is the responsibility of the 
commercial partner
• NASA Commercial Crew Program must provide a certification package (CoFR) to NASA 
Administrator indicating system is safe enough for NASA crew members to ride
• NASA Technical Authorities must concur with Certification and Risk Acceptance
• Resources to execute and manage CCP and meet agency expectations for Human Rated 
Program are limited therefore using Risk Based Approach to identify where, who, and how 
much so that crew safety is maintained
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AgendaCrew Safety – CCP Scope and Boundaries
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AgendaHuman Rating Requirements Flow down for CCP
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• While some areas of S&MA role have 
changed, S&MA has appropriate influence 
and authority
• S&MA TA is voting member of Safety 
Technical Review Board, Technical Review 
Board and Program Control Board
• CCP S&MA Office and TA have good working 
relationship with Program
• CCP S&MA Office works closely with S&MA 
TA
• Alternate path through KSC S&MA director if 
needed
• S&MA TA has direct path to OSMA if 
concerns are not heeded
Certification Strategy Acceptable to S&MA
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AgendaAssessment of Changes in Surveillance Scope and Roles 








• No concerns about reduced surveillance if:
• Maintain good communication between CCP offices
• Setup and maintenance of Surveillance database
• Adequate S&MA resources to support intra-program 
assurance role
• CCP S&MA Office and TA have good working 
relationship with Program
• CCP S&MA Office works closely with S&MA TA
• Alternate path through KSC S&MA director if needed
• S&MA TA has direct path to OSMA if concerns are 
not heeded
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AgendaAssessment of Accepted Risk Strategy








• Tracking and risk analysis modelled on LSP 
approach (Document KTI-3643)
• Information gathered from insight efforts
• Anomalies have progressive attention
• Evaluation → Watch Item → Risk
• Issues will arise from both Certification and 
mission-to-mission phases
• Design/mission/environment changes
• Non-conformances in build process
• Test failures from similar systems or other 
fleet vehicles
• Acceptance test results
• Use SMEs and VSEs to evaluate risk level
• Can supplement with independent 
assessments, NESC, etc.




Shared Assurance: A process that uses risk based decision making to 
identify and allocate resources based on level of risk while minimizing or 
eliminating organizational overlap and redundancy
Key Concepts:
• Technical Breadth remains unchanged
• Technical depth changes 
• Level of penetration determined by Risk Assessment
• NASA Insight is an essential to  identify and develop understanding of risk
• Minimize Organizational Redundancy (limit multiple organizations overlap) – important 
to clearly define roles and responsibilities
• End goal is Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR)



















CCP Shared Assurance – What is Different?
Next: How to get from Traditional to Shared Assurance Model
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CCP Shared Assurance - What are we giving up?
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Giving Up: Depth of Coverage for
Identified Low Risk Areas 
























































Sub systems and areas of Technical Risk




The profile is 
expected to be 





























































































• CCP is applying and verifying to Human Rating requirements
• HEOMD-CSD-10001 Rev A
• CCP is using a Risk Based Assessment approach to identify the areas of high 
risk and focusing resources onto those areas
• This is a living process and where risk arises adjustments will be made appropriately
• CCP is using a Shared Assurance model to adequately cover the identified 
areas with the right resources minimizing overlap and redundancy
• S&MA will not review everything but everything will be reviewed by a US government 
employee with the right knowledge and skills
• CCP S&MA’s Prime Mission is Crew Safety
Purpose – “…with the goal of achieving safe, reliable, and cost effective access 
to and from low Earth orbit (LEO) and the International Space Station (ISS).”
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FTRR Flight to ISS 
w/ Crew
(DM-2)


























Phase II Safety 
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